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Abstract
Funds generated through community forestry offer crucial and significant resources for rural
development in Nepal. This study examines forestry funds in 100 communities in three districts to
assess how large they are and how they are utilized.  The study finds that the income from
community funds increases local development resources by about 25%.  This income is invested
in schools, temples, roads, and water reservoirs, which bodes well for rural development.
However, there are some critical problems with the 'pro-poor programme’, an effort to reduce
poverty through the resources generated from community forestry.  The study finds that timber is
heavily subsidised and the subsidies accrue mainly to the non-poor.  Furthermore, income spent
on loans tends to favour the non-poor.  Overall some 74% of the benefits of community forestry
funds accrue to the non-poor while 26% accrue to the poor in rural communities in Nepal. The
study concludes that two actions may increase the benefits accruing to the poor: a) allowing all
households to have an equal share in timber that is harvested; and b) increasing the participation
of poor and less advantaged members in the executive committees that manage forestry funds.
Key Words: Community forestry funds, Nepal, timber subsidies, loans, poverty.
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Nepal’s Community Forestry Funds:  Do They Benefit the Poor?
Ridish K. Pokharel
1. Introduction
Nepal’s community forestry is over 25 years old and well established. By 2007, the government
had handed over 1,166,447 hectares of forestlands to 14,287 Community Forest User Groups
(CFUGs1), involving some 1.6 million households (DoF, 2007). In fact, over a third of Nepal’s
households2 are involved in managing these forests. Community forestry is considered quite a
success story in terms of improving the condition of forests and people in Nepal (Acharya, 2002;
Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Chakarborty, 2001; Dev et al., 2003; Dongol et al., 2002; Gautam
et al., 2004; Pokharel, 2003; Richard et al., 2003; Tachibana et al., 2001).
Community forestry in Nepal is a vital source of income generation. CFUGs earn through the
sale of forest products, membership fees and through fines from rule violators. According to one
estimate, the annual income of CFUGs is NRS 914 million (over US$10 millions), with forest
products contributing the major share (Kanel and Niraula, 2004). This income is not shared with
the government but is mobilised by communities for building local public goods and for forest
management. CFUGs are required to invest 25% of their income in forest development, while
the rest can be used for community purposes (Gautam at el., 2004). With this money, CFUGs
have constructed school buildings, temples, trails and roads.
In Nepal, community forestry is seen as an opportunity to reduce poverty, just as community-
driven development in many parts of the world (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Narayan, 2002). In
recent years, the government has introduced poverty reduction as an important objective of
community forestry. The poverty reduction strategy relies on a targeted pro-poor programme
that utilises CFUG funds. Under this programme, some portion of CFUG funds is expected to
be used to improve the lives of the poorest households through: a) micro-credit; b) self-employment
training and c) forest-land allocation for cash crops.
With this in mind, we want first to understand how much money community forestry actually
generates. This is useful knowledge because rural communities in Nepal have little direct access
to government funds. We want to verify whether community forestry is indeed enabling the ‘self-
financing’ of local public goods. A second objective of our study is to measure how much of the
investments made through community forestry really reach the poor (through pro-poor
programmes). Nepal’s Three Year Interim Development Plan has targeted 35% of the CFUG
fund to be utilized for its pro-poor activities (NPC, 2007). The question we want to be able to
answer is: does this pro-poor programme work the way it is designed to, and what if anything
can be done to improve it?
1 A group of people who regularly uses a particular forest for various purposes and organizes
themselves to manage, protect, and utilize the forest by forming a group
2 Total households of Nepal is 4,253,220 (NIDI, 2006)
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2. Study Area and Data
Nepal is divided into five development regions (eastern, central, western, mid-western, and far-
western) which contain 75 administrative districts ranging from high Himal to Tarai areas. Our
study covers three different mid-hill districts3:  Lamjung, Tanahu, and Kaski in Nepal’s western
development region (Figure 1). The three study districts represent a typical forest dependent
district in the mid-hills as they rely on subsistence agriculture and forest resources to sustain local
livelihoods. Crop production, livestock rearing, forestry, and to some small-scale enterprises are
the main sources of livelihood for people in these districts. The principal crops grown in the study
area are maize, millet and rice; livestock rearing is principally with buffalo and cattle. On average
about 70% of economically active population 10 years of age and over in the study areas are
engaged in agriculture and forestry (NIDI, 2006).
The three study districts are amongst the 29 hill districts in which community forestry was initiated
in the early 1980s as part of a first community forestry pilot project. The total forest area in the
study areas is 211,561 hectares of which a quarter has been handed over to CFUGs as community
forests. Our study area is particularly rich with CFUGs. As of January 2007, the western
development region contained 29% of all of Nepal’s CFUGs and of these over a quarter (27%)
belong to our three study districts (DoF, 2007). Furthermore, a fifth of the population which
directly receives benefits from the community forests in the development region is located in the
study areas.
The average age of a CFUG (as shown in Table 1) is 9.65 (± 2.8) years. Thus, these are mature
institutions. The average traveling time to market (41 minutes) and forest office (70 minutes)
shows that these CFUGs are located in relatively accessible areas.
For our study, a list of the CFUGs of the selected district was collected from the respective
District Forest Offices. We excluded CFUGs with a fund size of under NRS 20,000 as there is
a tendency to commence financial activity with a common fund only after the fund corpus is NRS
20,000 or more. We sorted CFUGs by fund size into three categories: a) NRS 20,000-NRS
49,999; b) NRS 50,000-NRS 99,999; and c) NRS 100,000 and above.
We selected 100 CFUGs randomly – 33 each from Lamjung and Tanahu districts, and 34 from
Kaski  – ensuring that 11 fit each of our three categories in each district. An additional CFUG
from NRS 100,000 and above category was selected from  Kaski district to fulfil the required
number of CFUGs for our study.
A structured questionnaire was prepared consisting of four sections: general information about
the Village Development Committee (VDC); CFUG-level information such as number of
households, forest area, and forest protection system; information about forest product use and
sources of income; and finally executive committee- level information (Appendix). Before
employing the questionnaire, we tested it in four CFUGs of Parbat district.
Our survey enumerators were six under-graduate forestry students. They were trained by the
3 This study excludes Tarai region where community forestry is very different from the mid-hills. The
forests in the Tarai are commercially more valuable than the hill forests. The communities in the Tarai
are also more heterogeneous than those in the mid-hills.
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researcher for three days to ensure they understood the logic of the questionnaire and the coding
required to fill it out. Once trained they were sent to research field sites for data collection which
was conducted from April to November 2006. Interviews were conducted with groups ranging
from one to six respondents, mostly CFUG executive committee members and often including
their chairperson and secretary. The mean interview group size our enumerators encountered
was 1.67 (standard deviation of 0.865). Interview locations ranged from tea stalls and chautaris
(resting place with tree shade) to CFUG office building and chairperson’s home.
A second round of data collection was made from 29 of the 100 original CFUGs in July 2007.
In this second round, we focused on collecting data on loan distribution patterns and timber
subsidy. The 29 CFUGs were a random selection from the original 100. Ten CFUGs each from
Kaski and Tanahu and nine from Lamjung districts were visited in this round.
Communities in our study area depend on agriculture (paddy and maize cultivation) and forest
produce. Per household forest area in our study districts is 0.85 ha, which is slightly higher than
the national average (DOF, 2007). About 65% of the forests in the study area are dominated by
Sal, an important timber species, which makes up about 49% of community forests in the study
areas. The remaining forest type is typically ‘Schima-castenopsis’, a tree species of lower value.
Timber, fuel wood and fodder are important products from the community forests.
In rural Nepal, caste structure can be an important determinant in decisions made locally. In our
sample, over one-half (54%) of the forest users’ households belong to advantaged groups, followed
by disadvantaged groups (28%) and dalit (18%). Advantaged groups appear to dominate all
sizes of community user groups4 in the study areas. To aid our understanding of patterns of
dominance, we define a community as being homogenous if three-fourths or more of the
households of a CFUG belong to the same group. With that definition, we find that only a third of
the communities managing community forests can be considered homogenous. Thus, while our
study area is dominated by households that belong to upper castes, these communities are socially
diverse and susceptible to a variety of pressures.
3. Income from Community Forestry
The CFUG in Nepal is a driver of income generation and forest products are a major source of
income. How much do CFUGs earn in our study area and what are the sources of that income?
We define CFUG income as its total revenues within a year from different sources such as sale of
forest products, collecting membership fees, levying penalties, and grants from such as NGOs.
We use two measures of income: average annual income (based on revenues collected in the
previous five years) and 2005 income. We were not able to get exact figures on  revenues in each
of the previous years. Thus, average annual income is calculated as the total investment
(expenditures) made by the CFUG in the last five years divided by five plus annual savings.
Annual savings is calculated as the current balance of the CFUGs in the account divided by age
of the CFUG.
4 The advantaged group includes different castes of brahmin, chhetri, thakuri, sanyasi, newar and
thakali. Similarly, disadvantaged group includes magar, tamang, gurung, rai limbu serpa, gharti/bhujel,
kumal, sunwar, jiral, chhantal, darai, majhi, thami, chepang, raute, kusunda, churaute/miya; and dalit
includes damai, kami, sarkee, gaine, and badi.
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In our study area, average CFUG income in 2005 was NRS 44,658 (Table 2). If we consider
average income over the last five years, we find that CFUGs on average earned an annual
income of NRS 63,202. If we include the value of subsidies in timber and fuel wood (estimated
in the next section), the average income of 100 CFUG in 2005 would be NRS 155,526 –
192,752 (Table 4). Including the subsidy increases the average fund income in 2005 on average
by nearly four to five times.
There are two notable issues about these numbers. First, our estimated revenues of CFUGs are
very much higher than current forest department estimates of CFUG income in these districts
(DOF 2007).5 In these three districts government statistics under-estimate CFUG income
by approximately 300%. The government’s data may be out of date, or their data may reflect
the peak Maoist insurgency years, when silvicultural operations and therefore income from this
stream was limited. It is also possible that CFUGs report lower incomes to the government from
fear of higher incomes being claimed by the government as attracting tax.6
Second, aggregating the CFUG income to the Village Development Committee (VDC7) level
shows that via these community funds, forests contribute NRS 124,381 per year to the average
VDC in the area. The government pays out some NRS 500,000 to each VDC as an annual
block grant (this is done irrespective of size of block, population and index of other developmental
infrastructures). CFUG income is therefore equivalent to approximately a quarter of the annual
block grant a VDC receives to conduct small scale development activities. Thus, forests, through
contributions to CFUGs, increase local ‘development’ funds by some 25% every year.
3.1 Accounting for Timber Subsidies
What contributes to forest funds and can these funds be increased? CFUG funds use revenue
from four key sources: a) timber, b) non-timber, c) membership fees, and d) assistance from I/
NGOs. Fund sizes vary depending on different factors such as forest area, number of user
households, type of species in the forest, and forest condition. As we show, subsidies play an
important role in determining fund size.
Timber is the main source of income for forest funds. Table 2 shows that three-fourths of the
income in the study area in 2005 is generated from selling forest products and the major share
(68% of the total) comes from timber alone. This finding is consistent with other studies such as
Kanel and Niraula (2004), and with Iversen et al. (2006). All CFUGs sold timber and obtained
a combined income of NRS 3,043,701in 2005.
Timber is used for building houses and making furniture. Sal from the Tarai is considered the best
quality timber and commands a higher price than hill Sal in the market. In Nepal’s rural areas, it
is the wealthier households that buy timber (in contrast poor households rarely build new houses
5 The average CFUG income in Tanahu, Kaski and Lamjung is estimated by the Department of Forests
as NRS 16,154, NRS 9,174, and NRS 16,986, respectively (DoF, 2007).
6 CFUGs have become suspicious of the government because of a policy amendment in 2001 that
required them to share 40 per cent of income generated from the commercial sale of surplus forests
products with the government.
7 Lower political administrative unit with the maximum population of 9,000 in urban area and minimum of
150 in the VDC of Manag District (Source: The Kathmandu Post, July 01, 2002)
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or have furniture made). Timber is generally first sold amongst the user group and if there is a
surplus, then to outsiders (whose own community forests are minus Sal).
CFUGs sell timber at a subsidised rate. In order to assess the income earned by CFUGs, we
estimate the extent of the subsidy. We focus on the 29 CFUGs in our second round wherein. We
explicitly collected user price data for Sal timber. User price refers to the actual price the forest
users obtain when they sell the forest products within and outside the group (Kanel, 2004).
CFUGs sell8 Sal for between NRS 20-225 per cubic foot (cu ft), with the average price being
NRS 75 for outsiders and NRS 65 for those within the community. Given that 23% of the sale of
Sal is to outsiders, the weighted average price of Sal sold by CFUGs is NRS 67 per cu ft. In
contrast, the local market price for round Sal timber is NRS 500- 600 per cu ft. We found that
24 of the 29 CFUGs sold Sal at well below these market prices.
Collecting data on the quantities of Sal and other timber separately proved difficult as CFUGs
record the value of timber sold but do not disaggregate by type. Our assumptions about the
amount of Sal sold considers that: in our study area 49% of the community forests are in Sal, so
we assume that 49% of the quantity of timber sold is Sal; we also know the average prices of Sal
(NRS 67) and non-Sal timber (NRS 22), the average value of timber (NRS 30,437) sold per
CFUG and the percentage of Sal versus non-Sal timber sold (49%).
Based on this information, we arrive at 345 cu ft of Sal and 333 cu ft of non-Sal timber sold per
CFUG in our study area. However, we also know that not every CFUG harvests Sal based on
the availability of ‘harvestable’ Sal. Field insights suggest more conservative assumptions about
how much Sal is sold, and we think 30% may be nearer the norm. With this understanding, the
estimated amounts of timber sold per CFUG are 257 cu ft of Sal and 600 cu ft of non-Sal timber.
To determine the timber subsidy, we estimate average Sal and non-Sal income from sales to
insiders and outsiders. We multiply the quantity of Sal sold by the market price and the difference
between the market value of timber and the CFUG sales value, which gives us the Sal subsidy.
The average income from sale of Sal timber was NRS 23,115 per CFUG in 2005. However, the
total value of Sal that would accrue to the average CFUG if Sal was sold at market prices is
NRS 196,305. Thus, the Sal subsidy equals NRS 145,945 (using the assumption that 49% of
the timber sold by CFUGs is Sal). If we use the more conservative estimate that 30% of the
timber sold is Sal, then the subsidy equals NRS 108,719 (see Table 3). Currently, some 77% of
the subsidy accrues to households within the community and 23% accrues to households from
other villages who buy Sal.
Based on differing assumptions of percentage of Sal sold, our analysis suggests that the average
annual timber income to a community would increase by five to seven times if Sal was not
subsidised (see Table 3). Furthermore, the average annual total income to a community would
increase by nearly four to five times if the subsidy did not exist.9
8 CFUGs have to pay an amount of 13% of the total revenue commercial sale of timber as Value Added
Tax (VAT). Recently, the government has also introduced a tax on forestry funds where CFUGs are
required to pay Nrs5 per cubic foot of timber revenues in the fund (P. Subedi, Assistant Forest Office,
pers. comm., 2008).
9 Average income of 100 CFUGs in 2005 is NRS 44658; Average income of 100 CFUGs from timber in
2005 is NRS 30437.
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If this is the extent of potential income for a CFUG that is being forfeited, who is it that gains from
the timber subsidy? To arrive at an answer, we calculate the subsidy for 100 CFUGs and also
examine which households (by economic status) obtain more timber.10 As Table 3 shows, it is the
non-poor who get most of the timber (81%) which means they also get most of the subsidy that
accrues to insiders in the community.
Many CFUGs in the hills have a quota system and award timber quotas within the community
based on needs and availability. The CFUGs charge a price for timber and require advance
payments, allowing access only to those who can afford it, i.e. the non-poor. An alternate system
that provided everybody in the community an option to either buy timber or to get a share from
timber sales would benefit the poor and non-poor equally. It would be perfectly appropriate, for
example, to allow everybody who did not buy timber in the last three years to get a share of the
timber that is ‘harvestable’.
Fuel wood is also subsidised by CFUGs. Green fuel wood from the community forest is usually
distributed equally to all users once a year. This occurs as they work collectively in the forest on
silvicultural tasks, extracting fuel wood by removing dead, diseased and dying trees. Fuel wood,
like timber, is given first to community users and then to outsiders at a relatively high price if there
is a surplus. In the study area, some 60% of the CFUGs distribute fuel wood to members free,
while the remainder charge for it. The price of fuel wood in the CFUG ranges from NRS 0.25 to
NRS 50 per bhari, depending on tree species and community rules, with an average price of
NRS 9.15 / bhari.11 This is a price significantly under the market price of NRS 80-NRS 100 per
bhari.
We find that CFUGs sell fuel wood to their members at a price that is 90 per cent lower than the
market price (see Table 3). The average income of CFUGs from fuel wood in 2005 was NRS
2,388 with subsidy (based on data from all 100 CFUGs). If we remove the subsidy, fuel wood
alone would generate the total amount of NRS 4,537, which was calculated by adding the value
of subsidy to the actual revenue from fuel wood. This figure is 90 per cent higher than the present
income from fuel wood. This is also an underestimation of the fuel wood subsidy because the
majority of CFUGs distribute fuel wood freely. Fodder, ground grass, and thatching grass are
other forest products that  provide real income to households, often distributed free to CFUG
members.
3.2 Other Sources
CFUGs obtain income from a variety of sources other than forest produce.These include penalties
paid, membership fees, assistance from international and other non-government organisations
10 CFUGs have classified household economic status into four categories: ultra poor – owns house only,
no regular income, work as wage labor to feed the family; poor – owns land and is good enough to
feed the family for six months or less from their own farmland, work as wage labor or borrows money
to feed the family for the remaining months; middle – owns land and is good enough to feed the family
for a year from their own farmland and also earns regular income through employment or other income
generating activities; rich – owns land and produces surplus products from own farmland and also
generates regular income from other income generating activities
11 Bhari is local unit for measuring fuel wood in the mid-hills of Nepal (one bhari = 30 kg)
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 (NGOs), the District Forest Office (DFO), and by renting out community halls and utensils. All
these sources together contribute 25% of the total CFUG fund. Only some 5% of CFUGs get
financial support from NGOs. The DFO provides technical support to CFUG rather than financial.
In the study area only 2 per cent of CFUGs have received financial support from the DFO.
A source of income that is surprisingly large and merits additional discussion is membership fees.
CFUGs charge a relatively high first membership fee to new members, the average for new
villagers being NRS 3326. A member who builds a new house is asked for a higher membership
fee compared with one who buys an existing house in the village. The average fees paid by new
members who intend to build new houses is NRS 5000.  Thus, CFUGs have devised a reasonable
strategy to make new members pay for any additional timber they may need from forests.
In the study area, membership fees amounted to 14 per cent of the income earned by CFUGs.
These fees are significantly higher than the amounts earned as penalties (2%) and as user fees
related to non-timber forest products (7%). From secondary data (NLSS, 2004), we know the
average annual income of households in our study districts to be NRS 82,568. With these paying
an average of 0.57% of their annual income as membership fees for CFUGs, what benefits make
this a reasonable expense for them?
4. CFUG Funds – How are they used?
The linked question – and the focus of our study – is: are CFUGs investing in the poor? CFUGs
usually invest their funds in four areas: (1) forest development; (2) public infrastructure
development; (3) pro-poor activities; and (4) forest administration. Forest development is defined
as any activity that improves the forest condition such as silvicultural operation, hiring a forest
watcher, and awareness campaigns. Development investments include building schools, roads
and water reservoirs. Pro-poor activities refer to allocating soft loans and programmes for training
self-employment skills.
To calculate the savings and investments made by CFUGs, we undertook the following tasks.
The annual saving was calculated as the current balance in the CFUG fund divided by the age of
the CFUG. Similarly, investments include the amount of expenditures spent each year on
infrastructure, financial support, pro-poor activities, forest development, and forest administration.
Our questionnaire gave us data from CFUGs on these investments for the last five years and for
2005. We did not have the data on 2005 investment for infrastructure so we estimated the annual
investment for assessing the CFUG investment. Annual investment was estimated as the total
investment in the last five years divided by five.
4.1 Different Forms of Investments
Based on the simple accounting of CFUG funds, we find that the average CFUG has a current
balance (end of the year income minus expenditures) of NRS 103,253. The average annual
saving and annual investment of the CFUG is NRS 11,629 and NRS 51,574 respectively.
We find that 55% of the annual investment of CFUGs is in public infrastructure development,
similar to observations of other studies such as Dongol et al. (2002) and Kanel and Niraula
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(2004). Each CFUG has invested an average of NRS 28,142 in community infrastructure annually
In the last five years, the total investment in our study area  on schools was NRS 2.6 million, on
roads NRS 2.5 million and on reservoirs NRS 667,000. Forest income thus catalysed an investment
of approximately NRS 6 million12 (over USD 90,000) in crucial local infrastructure in the area.
For many VDCs, there are no other sources of income except the block grant each receives
from the government.13 Thus, while it is challenging to estimate the full and multiplier effects of
CFUG investments on economic development in the villages, this influx of resources can play
vital role if the right investments are made.
What is the nature of community investments made with village funds? Our data indicates that
CFUG investments have gone into school buildings, temples, road/trail construction, VDC office
buildings, CFUG office buildings, water reservoirs, irrigation canals, community buildings, biogas
systems, mills, libraries, health posts, clubs, school toilets, bridges, check dams and children
development centres.
Standout investments are those in schools, temples, roads, and reservoirs: 60% of the CFUGs
have invested in school buildings. Similarly, 46% of CFUGs have invested part of their funds in
temples and 40% in reservoirs (Figure 2). That community investments in a majority of cases are
going into improving school infrastructure is a very good indicator of local importance placed on
schools. Similarly, CFUGs provided a total of NRS 1.9 million as salary for teachers in the last
five years.
Of other investments, 22% of annual investment is in pro-poor activities, followed by forest
development (17%) and forest administration (6%). The amount of money that is going to pro-
poor activity is a surprising finding. The last careful examination of funds by Kanel and Niraula
(2004) suggested that only three per cent of CFUG investments were directed for the poor.
In Table 5 we classify CFUGs according their fund size and look at three categories: CFUGs
with less than NRS 24,000 in income, with income between NRS 24,000 and NRS 52,000 and
those with more than NRS 52,000 in annual income. We find that in all three categories, about
50 per cent and more of the resources are invested in community development infrastructure and
the rest of the income is almost equally divided between pro-poor activity and forest development
plus administration. Thus, the size of the funds doesn’t seem to drive these investment decisions
in any particular direction.
Even so, CFUGs are mandated to put 25% of their income in forest development and maintenance
activities. The forest development works involves silvicultural operation, plantation, nursery
establishment, running awareness campaigns, providing training and study tours for forest users,
and paying salaries of forest watchers/nursery workers. Table 5 indicates that CFUGs do not
entirely comply with the 25% rule.
The CFUGs also invest part of their income on routine forest administration: honoraria for executive
members, meeting allowances, per diem and travelling allowances, renewing operational plan,
12 US$ 1 = NRS 64
13 In Nepal, a two-tiered of local government system exists. The district is considered the intermediary
level and Municipalities and Villages are at the lower level of the government structure. There are 75
districts, 58 municipalities and 3,913 VDCs in Nepal.
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auditing, and making signboards and stationery. An average of some 5% of total income is spent
on forest administration, suggesting a reasonably low overhead.
To return to the household-CFUG relationship, NRS 47 is paid by the typical household as a
membership fee (which goes into the CFUG fund). For every rupee of their membership fee, on
average, they invest NRS 83 on sustainable growth of the forests and administering the FUGs.
Notably, NRS 303 is invested in village public goods. This suggests that rural Nepalis have
bought into the idea of sustainability and public benefits.
4.2 Investments in Poverty Reduction: Who Actually Gains?
The central government encourages CFUGs to initiate pro-poor programmes by investing part
of their incomes for poverty reduction rather than being limited to fulfilling basic forestry needs.
The flow of soft loans to the poor, allocation of forestland for cash crops, training to build skills
for self-employment, scholarship, and financial support to the poor for buying medicine and
renovating their buildings are the activities supported by pro-poor programmes in community
forestry. What leads to a household being classified as poor? Different criteria are utilised such as
food sufficiency from a household’s own farmland for less than six months, land holding below a
certain size (three ropanies14), and type of housing.
We do not see any evidence of reluctance by CFUGs to invest in activities that are considered
pro-poor. In our study area, 61% of all CFUGs have undertaken pro-poor activities (Figure 3)
amongst which the granting of soft loans is very common. A quarter of the investment by CFUGs
in the last five years was in the form of loans to the forest users. In 2005, an average of 54% of
CFUGs’ revenues was made available as sanctioned loans (Table 6). Further, and notably, CFUGs
with more funds at their command invested a higher percentage in loans compared with smaller
CFUGs. This observation leads us to posit that these pro-poor activities take off after the CFUGs
reach a certain corpus size. While we know how much of CFUG funds are used as loans, our
data does not have sufficient detail to show us whether these are repeat loans or to what extent
these loans were repaid.
Among the pro-poor activities in 2005, CFUGs used an overwhelming portion (98%) of their
funds to give out loans, while one per cent each was used for providing scholarship and skills
training for self-employment (Figure 4). In the last five years, soft loans also comprise a higher
proportion of pro-poor activities (Figure 5). CFUGs have also offered financial support to the
poor for buying medicine or repairing their buildings, although that amount is very small.
The repayment term for CFUG loans varies from three months to one year and interest rates also
vary from one to two per cent per month, which is higher than the bank rate (10% and more per
year) and lower than that of the local moneylenders (2-3% per month). Although the interest rate
is higher than the bank rate, local people prefer a loan from the CFUG as the process is far easier
to negotiate (for example no collateral is required) and the CFUG is physically nearby.15 While
CFUGs are known to be accommodating on repayment schedules, the borrower must maintain
14 Ropani is local unit for measuring land in the mid-hills of Nepal (one ropani = 0.052 ha)
15 In the study areas, an individual requires traveling about two hours (106 minutes) to reach the nearest
bank for credit which means they are in the population of 21 per cent in the country who walks 1-2
hours to reach the bank (NLSS, 2004).
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a regular repayment record to be extended such a concession, which also depends on an executive
committee assessment of the household’s situation.
In order to better understand how loans were disbursed, we used the detailed data from our
second round of 29 CFUGs to analyze loan patterns. Examining the loan distribution in 2005, it
appears that all households – not only poor households – get benefits from soft loans. Our data
shows that in 2005, 13% of poor households and 10 % of non-poor households took soft loans
from CFUG funds (Table 7). The difference lies in the total value of the two groups of borrowers:
non-poor households (middle income and rich) obtained 70% of the total value of loans given
out in 2005 by CFUGs.
The question that we face is: why are non-poor households benefiting more than poor households
from an activity which is supposed to target the poor? During field visits, we found that there
were a few cases of lapsed loans, especially from very poor households. CFUG committee
members explained that the poor tend to take loans for one activity and use them in another,
making re-payment more difficult.
More careful scrutiny of the CFUGs methods revealed two fears. One is that CFUGs seem to
grant higher value loans to better-off households to show a low balance in their community
account. This they do apparently out of a suspicion that the government may claim unutilised
money. Second, there is the likelihood of elite capture whereby loans are given to members who
exercise power and authority in the village.
To better understand the issue of elite capture, we re-classified the 29 revisited CUGs into two
groups: (A) those that provided greater than 50% of the value of their total loans in 2005 to the
poor; and (B) those that provided less than 50% of the total value of the loans to the poor in the
same year.   We then looked at two indicators of representativeness of the poor: the average
number of disadvantage group households in each group and the average number of dalit
households on executive committees.  Our independent sample t-test results show that the number
of disadvantaged households is higher in group (A) (t = 2.766; p <.010) and representation of
dalit households in the executive committee was also significantly higher in group (A) (t = 2.075;
p <.048) relative to group (B). Thus, increased representation of lower caste households both at
the community level and in the executive committee is correlated with greater access to loans.
Finally, we look at the overall benefits received by forest farmers in our study area from CFUG
funds and the gains that have accrued to the poor versus the non-poor. There are four components
to the total annual benefits from CFUGs: a) expenditures on a variety of development activities
etc; b) loans made to the community; c) savings or wealth generated for the future; and, c)
subsidies given from timber sales. To determine the proportion of benefits that goes to the non-
poor instead of the poor, we approached the 2005 expenditures and subsidies using three
reasonable assumptions:
1. Based on our second survey round information, we assume 38 per cent of the population
in the study areas is poor and the remainder is non-poor. This distinction for our study
area is reinforced by other sources. For example, Joshi et al. (2007) indicate that
approximately 41% of the households in the study districts are marginal farm households.
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2. We assume that income spent on public infrastructure development and activities are
neutral and benefit both poor and non-poor equally. These investments include village
infrastructure, silvicultural operations, and awareness campaigns regarding forestry and
grants to schools. Annual savings are also considered poverty neutral.
3. We assume fuel wood from community forests benefits poor and non-poor equally since
the harvested green fuel wood from the forest in the study area is distributed equally.
Two aspects about how the funds are run have serious distributional effects. First, timber is
heavily subsidised (see Section 3.1, ‘Accounting for timber subsidies’) and the subsidies accrue
mainly to the non-poor. Second, income that is spent on loans favour the non-poor relative to the
poor.
In Table 8, we account for the different benefits and income stream for 2005 for the average
CFUG in our study area.  If we use the conservative estimate of 30% Sal harvests, then the
average CFUG provided a timber subsidy of NRS 101,490 (USD 1586) to the community in
2005, of which 19% went to the poor.  In the same year, 78% of the annual investment, NRS
40,306 (USD 630), was spent on a variety of development activities and these were poverty-
neutral. However, the remaining 22% (NRS 11, 268) was spent on loans and these favoured the
non-poor considerably. Added up, the total benefits from CFUG funds in 2005 – including
subsidies, savings, development investments and loans – was NRS  164,693 (USD 2573).
How did the poor fare overall? The poor received 26% (NRS 42,807) and non-poor 74%
(NRS 121,886) of the benefits from CFUG funds in 2005. When we recalculate these numbers
assuming that 49% of the timber sold is Sal, then we find that the poor gain 25% of the benefits
while the non-poor gain 75%. Given the population distribution in our study districts (approximately
40% poor and 60% non-poor), the poor are clearly getting less than their share.
4.3 Decision-making in the CFUG
Managing CFUG funds in the community forestry is becoming a challenging task as the funds
have grown in size and become popular with communities. Our analyses also suggest that there
is a need for a stronger pro-poor strategy in fund management. How are funds managed and
who manages them?
An executive committee, made up of a sub-group of community members of the CFUG,
administers the funds. Committee members are either elected or unanimously nominated by forest
users. The decision-making authority over fund development and use in principle lies with all the
members of CFUG and the executive committee is authorised to implement them. The committee is
usually directed to discuss investment activities in the general assembly before implementing them.
In practice, decisions are made by committee members and put forward to the assembly for
endorsement. The chairperson and secretary discuss the possible agenda informally before the
executive meetings. The CFUG committee considers the directive from the forest office, mandates
given by general assembly, constitution and operational plan. It also listens to requests from
various groups such as school management committee, mother group (ama samuha) and water
group in the villages. All these inputs shape its decisions, which could favour the non-poor if the
committee is dominated by local elites.
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The two key people on the CFUG committee are the chairperson and secretary. In our study
area, the chairperson is male, belongs to an advantaged group, and uses all forest products from
the community forests. His average land holding size is 18.37 ropanies (about one ha) which is
higher than the national average size of land holding (0.7 ha). The average length of holding the
post is about four years, which indicates that the average chairperson stays in the post for more
than one term. We find that while the secretary is generally younger than the chairperson and relatively
more educated, the post is held by males who in most cases belong to an advantaged community.
What of the composition of the rest of the committee? Our data indicates that nearly three
quarters (73%) of the committee members are male and the remaining (27%) are female. Similarly,
about two-thirds (64%) of the members in the executive committee are from advantaged groups,
followed by disadvantaged groups (27%) and dalit (9%).
Is elite capture in CFUGs likely? The answer is probably yes, based on the evidence that the
poor get fewer benefits and that the executive committee is dominated by better-off individuals.
However, there are other considerations. Leadership is very important in the CFUG. This means
that the chairperson has be an active individual who maintains a good relationship with forest
officials and motivates forest users as well. This position would be difficult to hold for a poor
villager, who is paid little respect in the hierarchical systems that dominate rural Nepal.
Almost all the chairpersons interviewed say that the condition of village forests have improved
after the community has taken management responsibility. They also say that CFUGs are effective
at delivering developmental activities at the village level. Thus, there is clearly local faith in the
institution and a strong sense of ownership.
5. Community-driven Development Through Forestry
Our study of the three mid-hill districts - Lamjung, Tanahu, and Kaski - shows that the ideas
underlying community-driven development (CDD) are being internalised in Nepal’s community
forestry. The underlying notion in projects designed to a CDD methodology is that community-
level participation and accountability will help ensure that the benefits of developments flow to
the community as a whole and more specifically to the poor (UNCDF, 1999).
CDD projects have emerged as a popular model for development assistance. One indicator of
their popularity is World Bank lending to community-based development projects, which increased
from USD 325 million in 1996 to USD 2 billion in 2003 (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Consonant
with an international view and experience, a number of studies indicate that in Nepal community
investments are an important component of CFUG expenditures (Dongol et al., 2002; Kanel
and Niraula, 2004). Furthermore, there is an increased perception among rural communities that
local infrastructure is improving as a result (Bajracharya et al., 2005).
If CFUG funds in Nepal are headed in the direction of most other social funds, what can we learn
from the global experience with these funds? A cross-country study conducted by Rawlings et al.
(2003) evaluating social funds in Armenia, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Zambia found
that geographically poor districts received more per capita of social fund expenditures relative to
wealthier districts. They further indicate that poor households were more likely to benefit from a
social fund investment in latrines and health clinics than better-off households.
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Even so, a number of studies (such as Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Galasso and Ravallion,
2005; Platteau, 2004; Rao and Ibanez, 2005) argue that community development projects are
often ineffective in reaching the poor as local elites frequently dominate community decision-
making. Indeed our study has noted such a tendency with our 100 CFUGs. Moreover, several
studies describe membership of CFUG and related benefits as favouring economically advantaged
groups (Graner, 1999; Kanel and Varughese, 2000; Malla, 2000; Malla et al., 2003).
Currently, these are the socially charged questions that fuel the debate over the poverty implications
of investments made by CFUGs in Nepal. A recurrent line of questioning concerns the extent to
which CFUG investments, which are dominated by rural infrastructure development, directly
benefit the poor. What projects do the poor prefer and do investments actually go into these?
Foster and Rosenzweig (2003), for example, argue based on Indian data that roads are pro-
poor investments, irrigation investments are pro-rich and schools are neutral. However, poor
households in Nepal may not view schooling as a benefit since they cannot afford to send their
children to school.
Education (and access to it), livelihood sources, social status and caste can be powerful influences
working outside a CDD umbrella. Poor households may not receive benefits from the community
forestry as expected since CFUG decisions often reflect the view of local elites who may influence
such decisions and indeed the discourse when they occupy executive positions (Banjade et al.,
2006; Baral and Subedi, 2000; Malla et al., 2003; Pokharel, 2003; Springgate-Baginski et al.,
1999). A study conducted by Hills and Shields (1998) in India also made similar observations
about Forest Protection Committees (FPC) of Joint Forest Management programmes. They
observed that leadership of the FPC tends to be in the hands of the better-educated local elites
who tend to be less dependent on the forests,
Similarly, Rao and Ibanez (2005) conclude that a social fund project within the community is
more likely to enhance the capacity of the relatively well-off to engage in collective action. They
further argue that any improvements in the ability to reach collective decisions are more likely to
have been realised by better networked and employed individuals. It can be argued that the
domination of the elite in executive committees may contribute to pro-poor programmes being
kept in the background as these would offer the wealthy few benefits.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Our study shows that CFUGs generate substantial income through their forest assets. This income
increases local development resources available to the community through block grants
by about 25%. Our study also indicates that the forest department currently under-estimates the
revenues obtained through CFUG funds by some 300%.
Timber contributes the major share (68%) to the funds. This is primarily because 49% of the
forests here are made up of Sal, an important and valuable tree. CFUGs currently sell Sal at a
price that is almost 90% lower than the market rate. If the subsidies were removed, the average
income earned by CFUGs would grow by nearly five times.
An issue to consider is whether subsidies for forest products are an incentive for the people in
managing the forest resources. These subsidies are mostly utilised by households in the same
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villages or those in adjacent villages without Sal. Thus, removing the subsidy would hurt rural
Nepalese and may reduce their incentive to manage the forests. It is also clear that the market
price for Sal is very high and there is demand for this wood elsewhere, which needs to be
captured. A further area of research and action for the forest department is to assess whether Sal
can be marketed externally through rural cooperatives or other organisations, enabling rural
communities to significantly increase their income.
CFUG funds have been successfully used to build up local infrastructure, and to build it up where
it counts: schools, roads and trails, reservoirs. Yet CFUGs fall short of the directive to set
aside 25% of their investment for forest development. Is there a case, for those CFUGs with
healthy forests, to reassess the rules? It may be appropriate to offer CFUGs some flexibility in
complying with this rule, but this will require more careful monitoring by the forest department.
Poverty reduction is an important focus of the CFUGs’ activity. Since the government’s drive to
make the CFUG programme pro-poor commenced only in 2004, there has been considerable
progress, with some 22 per cent of the annual expenditures in 2005 targeted for pro-poor
programmes. However, two distributional issues merit serious policy discussion. First, the subsidies
from timber go mainly to the non-poor in the villages. Second, ‘pro-poor’ loans also go mainly to
the non-poor. Overall, some 24% of the annual benefits from CFUG funds accrue to the
poor with 76% accruing to the non-poor.
Two actions may increase the benefits accruing to the poor.  These are: a) allowing all households
to have an equal share in timber that is harvested; and b) increasing the participation of poor and
less advantaged members in the executive committees that manage forestry funds.  We think it is
time to pilot alternative systems of timber revenue distribution to understand what the practical
challenges of implementation maybe.  Policy makers also need to send a clear message to CFUGS
about executive committee composition, loan distribution and who can access ‘pro-poor’ funds,
and the likely tax implications on remaining money.  This may change the incentives that are
currently at play that reduce loans to the poor.
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TABLES
Table 1: Basic characteristics of sampled CFUGs (n = 100)
Note: Number of parenthesis indicates standard deviation
ecruoS )SRN(tnuomaegarevA egatnecreP
1 rebmiT 734,03 61.86
rebmit-noN 612,3 02.7
2 ytlaneP 210,1 72.2
seefpihsrebmeM 141,6 57.31
sOGN/ImorfecnatsissA 036,2 88.5
FoDmorfecnatsissA 75 31.0
slisnetudnasllahgnitneR 561,1 16.2
3 latoT 856,44 001
Table 2: Income of CFUGs in 2005 from various sources (n = 100)
Note: Non-timber includes fuel wood, grasses, poles and NTFP
Forest
products
Others
naeM egatnecreP
1 )sraey(spuorgresutserofytinummocfoegA )08.2(56.9
2 GUFCrepsdlohesuohforebmuN )89.18(23.131
3 )ah(GUFCreptserofehtfoeziS )63.201(30.38
4 stserofytinummocniseicepslaSfotnecreP )30.23(36.84
5 stserofytinummocgnisustelmahforebmuN )48.2(71.5
6 )setunim(tekramlacolotemitgnilevarT )57.44(89.04
7 )setunim(eciffotserofotemitgnilevarT )43.85(41.07
8 stseroftnanimodlaSfoegatnecreP 00.56
9 stseroftnanimodsisponetsac-amihcsfoegatnecreP 00.53
01 GUFCsuonegomohfoegatnecreP 00.63
11 sdlohesuohpuorgdegatnavdafoegatnecreP 76.35
21 sdlohesuohtiladfoegatnecreP 98.71
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Table 3: Income from non-Sal timber, Sal timber and fuel wood with and without
subsidy in 2005 (n = 100)
1 )tnecrep(stserofytinummocehtmorfsGUFCybdlosrebmitlaSegarevA 94 03
2 )SRN(5002nirebmitmorfemocnI 734,03 734,03
3 )tfuc(5002nidlosrebmitlaSfoytitnauQ 543 752
4 )tfuc(5002niredistuootdlosytitnauqrebmitlaS 97 95
5 )tfuc(5002niytinummocehtotdlosytitnauqrebmitlaS 662 891
6 )SRN(levelGUFCtaecirprebmitlaSegarevA 76 76
7 )SRN(rebmitlaSfoecirptekramegarevA 965 965
8 )SRN(rebmitlaSniydisbusecirP 205 205
9 )SRN(5002nirebmitlaSmorfemocnI 511,32 912,71
01 )SRN(ecirptekramtaemocnietarenegdluowlaS 503,691 332,641
11 )SRN()%31-TAV(xattnemnrevoG 025,52 010,91
21 )SRN(dnufyrtserofnoxaT 527,1 582,1
31 )SRN(rebmitlaSmorfemocnietarenegdluowGUFC 060,961 839,521
41 )SRN(rebmitlaSniydisbuslatoT 549,541 917,801
51 )SRN(devomersiydisbusfiemocnirebmitlatoT 283,671 651,931
61 )tnecrep(lavomerydisbusmorfemocnirebmitniesaercnI 975 754
71 ytinummocehtnihtiwsdlohesuohotgniurccaydisbusfoegatnecreP 67 17
81 )tnecrep(5002niroop-nonybdeviecerrebmiT 18 18
91 )tnecrep(5002niroopybdeviecerrebmiT 91 91
02 )SRN(roop-nonybdeviecerrebmitlaSniydisbuS 910,801 664,08
12 )tnecrep(roop-nonybdeviecerrebmitlaSniydisbuS 18 18
22 )SRN(5002nidoowleufmorfemocnI 883,2 883,2
32 )SRN(levelGUFCtairahbrepdoowleuffoecirpegarevA 9 9
42 )SRN(irahbrepecirptekramegarevA 09 09
52 )tnecrep(doowleufniydisbusecirP 09 09
62 )SRN(doowleufniydisbusfotnuomA 941,2 941,2
72 )SRN(ydisbustuohtiwdoowleufmorfemocnI 735,4 735,4
82 )tnecrep(doowleufmorfemocniesaercnidluowlavomerydisbuS 09 09
92 saeraydutsehtnisdlohesuohroop-nonfotnecreP 26 26
03 ydutsehtnisdlohesuohroopfotnecreP 83 83
13 )SRN(5002niroop-nonybdeviecerdoowleufniydisbusfotnuomA 333,1 333,1
23 )SRN(5002niroopybdeviecerdoowleufniydisbusfotnuomA 718 718
33 )SRN(5002nidoowleufdnarebmitlaSniydisbusfotnuomalatoT 605,531 094,101
Per  CFUG
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tnuomA tnecreP tnuomA tnecreP tnuomA tnecreP tnuomA tnecreP
1 cilbuP
erutcurtsarfni
tnempoleved
241,82
)006,36(
54 212,4
)449,4(
13 738,41
)936,01(
83 709,46
)002,99(
84
2 roop-orP
semmargorp
406,11
)418,82(
81 209,1
)559,2(
41 793,7
)422,8(
91 924,52
)109,54(
91
3 tseroF
tnempoleved
918,8
)180,31(
41 849,2
)492,4(
22 828,7
)103,8(
02 667,51
)165,81(
11
4 tseroF
noitartsinimda
900,3
)616,3(
5 875,1
)934,1(
21 631,2
)082,2(
5 772,5
)619,4(
4
5 gnivaslaunnA
GUFCrep
926,11
)640,03(
81 338,2
)201,2(
12 789,6
)591,6(
81 519,42
)338,84(
81
6 emocnilaunnA
GUFCrep
202,36
)725,911(
001 374,31
)106,6(
001 581,93
)537,9(
001 392,631
)455,481(
001
Table 4: Total revenue of CFUGs in 2005 with and without subsidy  (n = 100)
ydisbushtiW ydisbustuohtiW
1 rebmiT 734,03 283,671-651,931 975-754
2 doowleuF 883,2 735,4 09
3 ssargdnuorg/reddoF 828 828 0
4 rehtO 500,11 500,11 0
5 latoT 856,44 257,291-625,551 234-843
Income in 2005 (NRS) Removing Subsidy
would increase
Income by (%)
Note: Others includes penalty, membership fees, assistance from I/NGOs and DoF, and renting halls
   and utensils.
Table 5: Annual investments of CFUGs in various activities and CFUG saving by
fund size
Note: Number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation; Fund size: 1 = up to NRS24,000; 2 = NRS24,001
– NRS52,000; 3 = higher than NRS52,000
Activity Annual investment of CFUGs by fund size (NRS)
n = 100 1 (n = 35) 2 (n = 31) 3 (n = 34)
SANDEE Working Paper No. 31-08 21
tnuomA tnecreP tnuomA tnecreP tnuomA tnecreP tnuomA tnecreP
1 nisnaolfowolF
eviftsaleht
sraey
070,65
)596,241(
52 154,9
)367,41(
12 785,63
)189,04(
62 228,121
)315,822(
52
2 launnafowolF
snaol
412,11
)835,82(
81 098,1
)259,2(
41 713,7
)691,8(
91 463,42
)207,54(
81
3 nisnaolfowolF
5002
392,42
)164,74(
45 031,4
)952,8(
64 783,81
)536,42(
56 334,05
)184,07(
25
4 GUFC
nistnemtsevni
sraey5tsaleht
210,422 887,54 482,241 499,184
5 launnaGUFC
emocni
202,36 374,31 581,93 392,631
6 niemocniGUFC
5002
856,44 120,9 763,82 491,69
Table 6: Percentage of investment in giving out loans, by fund size
Activity Flow of loan by fund size (NRS)
n = 100 1 (n = 35) 2 (n = 31) 3 (n = 34)
Note: Number in parenthesis indicates standard deviation; Fund size: 1 = up to NRS24,000; 2 = NRS24,001
– NRS52,000; 3 = higher than NRS52,000
Table 7: Flow of loans in 2005 and 2006 (n = 29)
rooP roop-noN latoT
1 sdlohesuohforebmunegarevA
5002nisnaolnevig
)40.7(71.6 )76.8(39.7
2 nituodenaoltnuomaegarevA
)SRN(5002
)194,82(665,61 )698,34(138,83
3 nevigsdlohesuohfoegatnecreP
5002nisnaol
31 01
4 nevigsdlohesuohforebmunlatoT
5002nisnaol
971 222 104
5 tnuomatuodenaolfonoitubirtsiD
)tnecrep(5002ni
03 07 001
22 SANDEE Working Paper No. 31-08
Table 8: Overall Benefits from CFUG Funds (2005)
rooP roop-noN latoT
1 ydutsehtnisdlohesuohfotnecreP
saera
83 26 001
2 )SRN(ydisbusdoowleufdnarebmiT 62-196,91 , 451
)%91(
153,901-997,18
)%18(
605,531-094,101
3 )SRN(seitivitcatnempolevedlaunnA 613,51
)%83(
099,42
)%26(
603,04
4 )SRN(snaolfowolflaunnA 083,3
)%03(
888,7
)%07(
862,11
5 )SRN(gnivaslaunnA 914,4
)%83(
012,7
)%26(
926,11
6 )SRN(stifeneblatoT 072,94-708,24
)%52-62(
)077-966(DSU
834,941-688,121
)%57-47(
)533,2-409,1(DSU
907,891-396,461
)501,3-375,2(DSU
Benefits per CFUG
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Map of study areas
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Figure 2: Infrastructural Investments made by CFUGs
Figure 3: CFUGs investing in pro-poor programmes
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Figure 4: Pro-poor investments made by CFUGs in 2005
Figure 5: Pro-poor investments made by CFUGs in the last five years
Figure 6: Benefits from different activities and overall benefits received by poor and
non-poor from CFUG funds (per cent)
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire Survey on Community Forest
User Group’s Income and Expenditures
Survey date Survey
(d/m/y): ID
Started time: Finished time:
Name of
enumerator:
Greetings! the Institute of Forestry is conducting a research on poverty reduction through CFUG
funds in Nepal in this district and require to conduct interviews with the executive members of
CFUG, especially chairperson and secretary to know about CFUG fund investments on pro-
poor programs. This research is solely for academic reasons and all your responses will remain
confidential. We will try our best to share the results of our research with you once completed.
We will be extremely grateful if you agree to collaborate with us and give some of your time to
answer a set of questions we have. The questions are designed to help us understand how your
CFUG is generating funds, how the funds are being invested, and the characteristics of the
CFUG and CFUGC that you are involved in. We thank you for your time and eagerly hope for
your co-operation.
A. Number of executive members participated in the interview:
1
2
3
4
Name Designation
Section I. Village Development Committee (VDC) Level Information
1.1 Name of the district:
1.2 Name of the VDC:
1.3 Total population of the VDC:
Would you like to participate in the interview?
Yes
No
u Proceed to
question A
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4.1 ytilicafelbaliavA edoC
1.4.1 loohcsyramirP
2.4.1 loohcsyradnoceS
3.4.1 loohcsyradnocesrehgiH
4.4.1 tsophtlaeH
5.4.1 eciffotsoP
6.4.1 eciffotseroF
7.4.1 eciffotiderc/knaB
1.5 Are there any NGO/INGO working in the VDC? (0 = no; 1 = yes)
If yes, type of work they are involved in 
(Code: 1=social reform; 2=community development; 3=education & training; 4=resource
conservation & management; 5 = micro credit; 6 = research & development; 7 = health;
8 = decentralization & governance; 9 = other)
Facility available in the
VDC (Code: 0 = no; 1
= yes)
6.1 sporC 3-1knaR
1.7.1 yddaP
2.7.1 taehW
3.7.1 telliM
4.7.1 eziaM
5.7.1 yelraB
What are the most
common crops grwon in
the VDC?
1.7 Number of households
draW
rebmun
degtanavdA
puorg
degatnavdasiD
puorg
tilaD latoT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
latoT
Advantaged group = brahman, chhetri, thakuri, sanyasi, newar, thakali; Disadvanataged group = magar,
tamang, gurung, rai, limbu, serpa, gharti/bhujel, kumal, sunwar, jirel, chhantal, darai, majhi, thami,
chepangraute, kusunda, churoute; Dalit = kami, damai, sarki, gaine, badi
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1.8 Number of household in the VDC with and without agricultural land and livestock
.1
puorg.vdA
.2
puorg.vdasiD
.3
tilaD latoT
1.8 htiwdlohesuohfo.oN
dnallarutlucirga
2.8 htiwsdlohesuohfo.oN
.gaon;ylnotaogrokcotsevil
dnal
3.8 tuohtiwsdlohesuohfo.oN
kcotsevil,dnallarutlucirga
taogdna
latoT
Household number with different groups
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Section II. Community Forest User Group (CFUG) Level Information
1.2 1.1.2 GUFCfoemaN
2.1.2 GUFCotrevodednahtserofforaeY
3.1.2 GUFCehtnidedulcnisdrawforebmuN
4.1.2 tserofytinummocehtfoaerA seratceh
5.1.2 GUFCehtnidedulcnidlohesuohforebmuN sdlohesuoh
6.1.2 GUFCehtfonoitalupoplatoT snosrep
7.1.2 tserofytinummocsihtgnisustelmahforebmuN
2.2 ytilicaF )nim(ekatemiT edoC mKxorppA
1.2.2 tekraM
2.2.2 loohcS
3.2.2 tsophtlaeH
4.2.2 tiderc/knaB
5.2.2 eciffotseroF
6.2.2 tseroflanoitaN
Proximity to
facility from
CFUG office to
the nearest ...(1.
C o d e :
1 = w a l k i n g ;
2=bus; 3=bus
and walking)
2.3 Number of households with and without agricultural land and livestock in the CFUG
cinhte/etsaC
puorg
dnallarutlucirgA.1 taogrokcotseviL.3
ylno
,dnalirgaoN.4
taogdnakcotsevil
1.3.2 namharB
2.3.2 irtehhC
3.3.2 irukahT
4.3.2 isaynaS
5.3.2 raweN
6.3.2 ilakahT
7.3.2 gnuruG
8.3.2 gnamaT
9.3.2 ubmiL/iaR
01.3.2 ragaM
11.3.2 rawnuS
21.3.2 tilaD
latoT
Number of households with
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9.2 etaR
redneG remmuS retniW
1.9.2 elaM
2.9.2 elameF
2.4 Forest status (obtained from records and the operational plan)
1.4.2 deraperpsawPOnehwraeY
2.4.2 sutatsnoitarenegeR ahrep
3.4.2 ytisnedeerT ahrep
4.4.2 seicepseerttnanimoD
5.4.2 tserofehtnilasfoecneserP
6.4.2 tserofehtfokcotsgniworG ahreptfuc%
.2 5 eloR 3-1knaR
1.5.2 ecivdalacinhceT
2.5.2 troppuslaicnaniF
3.5.2 yrotalugeR
4.5.2 noitatilicaF
5.5.2 snoitulosertcilfnoC
What has been the role of
Forest Department in the
last year?
6.2
edoC elaM elameF
1.6.2 rehctaW
No. of watcher in the last yearNo. of forest
watcher, if any
(1 code 1=year
round; 2=seasonal)
What is the local wage rate? (NRS
per day)
8.2
elaM elameF tnepsemiT
)rh(
1.8.2 reetnuloV
Number of
individuals per day
voluntarily guard
the forest on
rotational basis
Number of volunteer per day Days
spent in
the last
12 month
.2 7
elaM elameF latoT
1.7.2 yralaS
Monthly salary for a watcherWhat is the salary of
forest watcher?, if
any
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Section III. Forest Product Use Information
1.3 stcudorP 3-1knaR
1.1.3 doowleuF
2.1.3 sessarg/reddoF
3.1.3 rebmiT
4.1.3 eloP
5.1.3 rettilfaeL
6.1.3 gnizarG
What forest products are used
mainly from the community
forest?
2.3
segrahC ecirP tinU foedoM
noitcelloc
1.2.3 doowerifneerG
2.2.3 sehcnarbdaeD
3.2.3 rebmiT
4.2.3 eloP
5.2.3 reddofeerT
6.2.3 rettilfaeL
7.2.3 sessarG
8.2.3 ssarggnihctahT
9.2.3 tun/stiurF
01.2.3 PFTN
11.2.3 gnizarG
Regulation in collecting
forest products (Code for
charges: 0=no; 1=yes) (Code
for mode of collection:
1=daily; 2=seasonal)
Forest
products
Regulation
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3.3
tsriF dnoceS drihT
1.3.3 doowerifneerG
2.3.3 sehcnarbdaeD
3.3.3 rebmiT
4.3.3 eloP
5.3.3 reddofeerT
6.3.3 rettilfaeL
7.3.3 sessarG
8.3.3 ssarggnihctahT
9.3.3 stun/stiurF
01.3.3 PFTN
11.3.3 gnizarG
21.3.3 gnitnuH
31.3.3 tserofehtnoeriftuP
41.3.3 ytivitcaehtninoitapicitrapoN
CGUFCybdetceridsa
What type of penalties is
imposed for different forest
products if someone violates
the rules? (Code for offence:
1=cash payment; 2=returning
collected products; 3=both
(cash payment and returning
collected products);
4=exclusion from the
group; 9=other)
Forest products
and activity
Offence
4.3
emittsriF emitdnoceS emitdrihT
1.4.3 tnuomA
If cash payment for no
participation in the activity as
directed by CFUG, indicate the
amount (NRS)
Cash payment
5.3
1 2 latoT
1.5.3 dooweriF
2.5.3 rebmiT
3.5.3 eloP
4.5.3 ssarggnihctahT
5.5.3 PFTN
6.5.3 sessarG
7.5.3 sgnildeeS
8.5.3 rettilfaeL
latoT
Income of CFUG in 2005 by
selling the forest products
within and outside the
community (Code: 1=within the
community; 2=outside the
community)
Amount (NRS)Forest
products
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7.3 5002 4002 3002
esaelp,OGN/ImorftroppuslaicnaniffI
)SRN(tnuomaehtetacidni
3.6 Income in 2005 from other sources
ecruoS )SRN(tnuomA
1.6.3 ytlaneP
2.6.3 eefyrtne/eefpihsrebmeM
3.6.3 OGN/ronodmorfecnatsissA
4.6.3 eciffotserofmorfecnatsissA
5.6.3 srehtO
latoT
3.8 What is the total balance in the CFUG fund until today? (NRS)
9.3
ytivitcA GUFC.1 srehtO.2 latoT
1.9.3 gnidliubloohcS
2.9.3 elpmeT
3.9.3 daor/liarT
4.9.3 eciffoCDV
5.9.3 eciffoGUFC
6.9.3 riovreserretaW
7.9.3 slanaclanoitagirrI
8.9.3 noitarenegyticirtcelE
9.9.3 gnidliubytinummoC
01.9.3 )yficeps(srehtO
Amount (NRS) spent by
Total amount spent by
CFUG for the
developmental works in
the last five years (Others
include such as VDC or
DDC support
01.3
ytivitcA 5002 nilatoT
sraey5
detratS
ecnis
1.01.3 loohcsrofstnarG
2.01.3 rehcaetrofyralaS
3.01.3 srehtO
latoT
Financial support
provided by CFUG
Amount (NRS) in
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41.3
1.41.3 naoltfosfowolF 5002 nilatoT
sraey5
ecniS
detrats
2.41.3 gniniartdetneirollikS
3.41.3 pihsralohcS
4.41.3 taoG
5.41.3 enihcamgniweS
6.41.3 )gk(regniG
7.41.3 )yficeps(srehtO
3.11 Does your CFUG undertake any poor directed activity? (Code: 0=no; 1=yes)
21.3 airetirC 3-1knaR
1.21.3 emocniralugeroN
2.21.3 6nahtsselrofycneiciffusdooF
dnalmrafnwomorfshtnom
3.21.3 <(ezisgnidlohdnaL napor3 )i
4.21.3 gnisuohfoepyT
What criteria are used to
identify poor household, if
any?
31.3
1.31.3 naoltfosfowolF 5002 nilatoT
sraey5
ecniS
detrats
2.31.3 llikstnemyolpme-fleS
gniniartdetneiro
3.31.3 rooprofpihsralohcS
4.31.3 )yficeps(srehtO
Total amount spent in
poor directed activities in
the last five years
Amount (NRS) spent in
Number of households
or individuals received
loan or scholarship or
in-kind support by
CFUG in the last five
years
Number of household/
individual
51.3 5002nI nilatoT
sraey5
ecniS
detrats
1.51.3 )sinapor(aeratseroF
2.51.3 dlohesuohforebmuN
Allocated community
forest land to poor for
inter-cropping, if any
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61.3
tnempolevedtseroF
skrow
5002 nilatoT
sraey5
ecniS
detrats
1.61.3 noitarepolarutlucivliS
2.61.3 yresrun/noitatnalP
3.61.3 ngiapmacssenerawA
4.61.3 ruotyduts/gniniarT
5.61.3 rehctawrofyralaS
6.61.3 yresrunrofyralaS
rekrow
Amount (NRS) spent in
Total amount spent by
CFUG for forest
development works in
the last five years
71.3
tnempolevedtseroF
skrow
5002 nilatoT
sraey5
ecniS
detrats
1.71.3 ynafi,muiraronoH
2.71.3 ecnawollagniteeM
3.71.3 ecnawollagnilevarT
4.71.3 meidreP
5.71.3 suoenallecsiM
latoT
Amount (NRS) spent in
Total amount spent by
CFUG in administration in
the last five years
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2.4 tsoP edoC
1.2.4 nosrepriahC
2.2.4 nosrepriahceciV
3.2.4 yraterceS
4.2.4 rerusaerT
5.2.4 rebmeM
Who is responsible for liaising
with forest office in the
committee? (1 Code: 0=no;
1=yes)
Section IV. Executive Committee Level Information
4.1 Total member in the Community Forest User Group Committee (CFUGC):
tsoP .1
redneG
.2
)sry(egA
.3
roetsaC
puorgcinhte
.4
noitacudE
.5
otnoitaleR
nosrepriahc
.6
gnidlohfohtgneL
)sry(tsop
1.1.4 nosrepriahC
2.1.4 nosrepriahceciV
3.1.4 yraterceS
4.1.4 yratercestnioJ
5.1.4 rerusaerT
6.1.4 rebmeM
7.1.4 rebmeM
8.1.4 rebmeM
9.1.4 rebmeM
01.1.4 rebmeM
11.1.4 rebmeM
Education: Number of year completed in the formal class (Code for gender: 1=male; 2=female) (Code for
caste/ethnic group: 1=brahman/chhetri/thakuri; 2=sanyasi; 3=newar; 4=gurung/magar/tamang; 5=dalit)
(Code for relationship: 1=spouse; 2=son/daughter; 3=son/daughter in law; 4=grandchild; 5=mother/father;
6=mother/father in law; 7=brother/sister; 8=brother/sister in law; 9=uncle/aunt; 10=niece/nephew; 11=step
child; 12=not related)
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dnaL
)inapor(
fo.oN
kcotsevil
fo.oN
taog
1.3.4 nosrepriahC
2.3.4 nosrepriahceciV
3.3.4 yraterceS
4.3.4 yratercestnioJ
5.3.4 rerusaerT
6.3.4 rebmeM
7.3.4 rebmeM
8.3.4 rebmeM
9.3.4 rebmeM
01.3.4 rebmeM
11.3.4 rebmeM
3. Assets owned
Post
1.
Use of
products
2. No. of
training or
tour attended
in 5 yrs
(Code for forest products use by the executive members: 1=all forest products; 2=only timber and green
firewood; 3=other forest products such as dried branches, leaf litter and grasses; 4=not at all)
4.4 Number of meeting held by the executive committee in 2005:
4.3 The extent of use of forest products by the executive members from community forest
5.4
1.5.4 elaM 5002 sraey5nilatoT
2.5.4 elameF
Number of CFUG members
participated in the study tour
or training in the last five
years
Study tour/training in
6.4 sraey5tsalehtnI raeynoitcelE
1.6.4 noitcelE
Do you have election to decide
the committee members? (Code:
0=no; 1=yes)
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4.8 Chairperson’s perception towards community forestry (1 Code: 0=disagree; 1=agree)
tnemetatsehtnonoitpecreP edoC
1.8.4 sraeyeviftsalehtrevodevorpmisahnoitidnoctseroF
2.8.4 desaercnisahFCretfarebmitdnadoowleufotsseccaytinummoC
3.8.4 GUFCfotluserasadesaercedsahtserofotdetalertcilfnoC
4.8.4 FCretfadevorpmisahtnemtrapeDtseroFehthtiwnoitcaretnI
7.4
FoD.1 OGN.2
1.7.4 5002nigniteeM
Number of meeting w/Number of meeting held with
forest officials and development
workers in 2005
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